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CHAPTER 22 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
David A. Wirth* 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter surveys settings under the auspices of international organizations and 
institutions that address the environment and highlights a number of underappreciated 
structural attributes of international environmental governance.  A variety of approaches 
to treating environment on the multilateral level are categorized, resulting in a typology 
of both international institutional structures and the diversity of international instruments 
and policy tools available for promoting substantive international environmental policy.  
Utilizing examples that are intended to be illustrative of specific aspects of the challenges 
presented by international environmental policy and law rather than exhaustive,
1
 the 
piece concludes by examining the extent to which form effectively follows function on a 
variety of subject matter areas from the point of view of multilateral governance. 
 
A number of conclusions emerge from this analysis.  First, many international 
organizations whose functional orientation is not primarily environmental, including the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Trade 
Organization, are very active on environmental issues.  Further, only one international 
institution – the United Nations Environment Program, which is not even formally an 
international organization -- is charged with environment as its primary mission.  Third, 
the treatment of environment is highly compartmentalized and fragmented, distributed 
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among multiple multilateral institutions and international agreements.  Last, an 
identifiable model of an organic treaty establishing a comprehensive, self-contained 
regime has emerged in recent years.  The environmental-treaty-as-governance-structure is 
an alternative to, although in some ways the functional equivalent of, a formal 
international organization as an international institutional vehicle for addressing 
environmental issues.   
 
2.  UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 
 
This section addresses environmental activities within the United Nations system 
narrowly understood as including entities that ultimately report to the General Assembly.  
Primarily for the sake of establishing institutional distinctions, the work of specialized 
agencies established pursuant to their own constitutive treaties is treated in the following 
section.  The significance of this delimitation, however, should not be overemphasized, as 
with almost everything in the field of environmental governance strict 
compartmentalization as a conceptual matter is difficult or impossible.   
 
2.1 High-Level Conferences and Agenda Setting 
 
 Although a number of multilateral environmental agreements predate it, the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, is 
generally considered a major turning point that initiated the development of truly 
international environmental policy and law.  The Stockholm meeting produced a 
conference declaration containing twenty-six principles and an action plan including 109 
recommendations for future implementation at the international level by both states and 
the United Nations. 
 
 Among its more concrete accomplishments, the Stockholm Conference 
recommended the creation of a Governing Council for Environmental Programs and 
Environment Secretariat headed by an Executive Director.  The General Assembly 
subsequently established the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), virtually the 
sole international institution whose mission is strictly environmental in nature.  The 
Stockholm Conference left a legacy that resulted from meeting's identification of the 
need for multilateral collaboration and concerted action with respect to the environment 
as a matter of urgency in international environmental policy and law. 
 
On the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations 
sponsored a Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the so-called 
"Earth Summit," in Rio de Janeiro.  The 1992 Earth Summit was expressly and self-
consciously styled by its organizers as a successor to the earlier Stockholm Conference.  
More than 180 states were represented at, and over 100 heads of state or government 
attended, the Rio meeting, which was the largest summit-level conference to that date. 
 
Like the Stockholm meeting, UNCED adopted an action plan for the future, 
known as Agenda 21, and created a new organ of the United Nations, the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) specifically to oversee subsequent implementation.    
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The Conference also adopted a statement analogous to the Stockholm Declaration – the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
2
 – and two major multilateral 
conventions, one addressing climate change and the other biological diversity. Follow-up 
meetings have since been held at ten-year intervals in Johannesburg in 2002 and Rio in 
2012, respectively, coordinated by the CSD as one of a number of functional 
commissions that report to ECOSOC.  Although receiving a great deal of public 
attention, from a structural point of view the Stockholm Conference, UNCED, and 
succeeding events are best understood as free-standing agenda-setting exercises, intended 
to catalyze further action in the form of relatively specific follow-up activities to be 
pursued in other UN bodies – chiefly although not exclusively UNEP. 
 
2.2. United Nations Environment Program 
 
 As the principal structural innovation from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, as 
one of the few international institutions devoted strictly to the environment, and due to its 
global mandate, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has received a great 
deal of attention as a principal node in the structure of global environmental governance.  
Formally speaking, UNEP is a UN program, reporting to the General Assembly through 
ECOSOC, and not a specialized agency.  Formerly overseen by a Governing Body of 58 
members elected by the General Assembly for four-year terms, in 2013 as part of an 
attempt to enhance UNEP’s effectiveness the Governing Body was replaced by the 
United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), with universal membership.  The 
Secretariat, headed by the Executive Director, is headquartered in Nairobi, with six 
regional offices.
3
 
 
Through what is now known as the Division of Environmental Law and 
Conventions (DELC), UNEP specifically addresses the progressive development of 
international environmental law, governance, and policy.  The Program has played a 
major role as a forum for the negotiation of major global environmental agreements, 
including those on exports of hazardous wastes and chemicals and pesticides, regulation 
and elimination of persistent organic pollutants, protection of the ozone layer, and the 
UNCED convention on biological diversity.  DELC coordinates with the secretariats for 
these agreements, as well as others on migratory species and international trade in 
endangered species. 
 
UNEP has also served as a forum for negotiating any number of non-binding or 
“soft” instruments on issues such as management of hazardous waste, trade in chemicals 
and pesticides, and environmental impact assessment.  In any number of cases, these 
good practice standards and guidelines have served as precursors to binding instruments, 
allowing states to gain experience and become comfortable with international cooperation 
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and harmonization in a voluntary mode before accepting the binding obligations 
contained in a multilateral treaty.  UNEP has also provided technical assistance, 
particularly to developing countries, and managed clearinghouses for exchange of 
environmental information and data.  To that extent, on the issues it addresses, UNEP 
might be called a “full service” organization, providing opportunities for a full range of 
policy options ranging from providing advisory perspectives upon request to crafting 
binding obligations and overseeing their subsequent implementation. 
 
 2.3 UN Economic Commission for Europe 
 
 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) is one of a number 
of regional commissions -- including those for Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Asia and the Pacific, and Western Asia – that report to ECOSOC.  The 56 member states 
of the Commission include North America, Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Turkey and 
Israel, comprising an area of 47 square kilometers.  Its secretariat is located in Geneva.  
Unlike UNEP and the CSD, the ECE, although a UN body, has a limited, regional 
geographic scope. 
 
 The treatment of environment in the ECE has its roots in diplomatic efforts in a 
security context at least fifteen years before the end of the Cold War, most notably in the 
context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), popularly 
known as the "Helsinki process."  As the CSCE itself had little organizational structure or 
capacity to oversee implementation of this mandate, the ECE was a natural choice among 
then-existing international institutions.  Especially with respect to the then-emerging 
issue of acid rain, involving long-range transport of pollutants in both directions across 
the Iron Curtain, the ECE had the advantage of including both the NATO countries of 
western Europe and North America and those the Warsaw Pact, the USSR and its Eastern 
European allies.  Some of those activities, including environment, have now been taken 
up by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
 The ECE is now active in a number of substantive environmental policy areas, 
under the direction of its Environmental Policy Committee.  Most notably, the ECE has 
served as a forum for the negotiation of major regional agreements on (1) transboundary 
air pollution; (2) transboundary watercourses and international lakes; (3) transboundary 
effects of industrial accidents; (4) environmental impact assessment, a tool for studying 
environmental effects of interventions in the ecosphere before they are undertaken; and 
(5) access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters.   
 
The ECE Secretariat services periodic meetings of the parties to these agreements, 
[check] which otherwise have much in common with the formally free-standing 
multilateral environmental regimes discussed in section 6  below.  For example, eight 
ancillary protocols have been adopted to the  ECE’s 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, whose Executive Body comprising representatives of all 
states parties to the agreement meets annually.  Like much else in the field of 
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environmental governance, the ECE’s work is something of a hybrid among models that 
tend to merge fluidly one into another. 
 
3. UN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS 
  
 Among UN specialized agencies and those identified by the UN as related 
organizations, none deals exclusively with environmental policy, and most of those that 
do have rather different mandates.  This is hardly surprising, as environment as a 
substantive issue area cuts across functional lines, both engaging and being engaged by 
other substantive fields.   
 
 3.1. International Maritime Organization 
 
 In addition to its work on maritime security and safety, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has served as a forum for negotiating at least two major agreements 
designed to protect the marine environment.  As with the ECE-sponsored agreements 
discussed in the previous section, these are organic instruments designed to establish 
institutional architecture that will be responsive over time to new scientific evidence and 
progressive policy development.  Similarly, the IMO provides secretariat services and 
sponsors periodic meetings of the states parties to these agreement. 
 
 The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) is a multilateral agreement of potentially 
global scope designed to address one component of the maritime pollution problem, 
namely dumping at sea. The original London Convention adopted a “black list” of toxic 
substances whose dumping was prohibited altogether and a second “grey list” of 
substances, such as wastes containing other heavy metals, which require a special permit 
in advance.  In an example of the malleability of multilateral treaty regimes, in 1996 the 
states parties to the 1972 London Convention essentially scrapped the original agreement 
and replaced it with a new Protocol based on a significantly different regulatory design 
that supersedes the existing 1972 instrument for parties to both agreements. Adopting a 
precautionary approach, the London Protocol turns the regulatory design of the earlier 
agreement on its head by prohibiting ocean dumping altogether unless the activity is 
specifically authorized by the new agreement.  Among the very restricted categories of 
waste for which ocean disposal is allowed are sewage sludge, waste from fishing 
operations, and organic material of natural origin.  
 
 The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as 
modified by a 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78) is a second major environmental 
agreement adopted under IMO auspices.  Like the London Convention and Protocol, the 
MARPOL regime is not a static snapshot, but a living entity intended to adapt to changed 
circumstances or policy developments over time.  While that may be desirable from a 
policy point of view, the legal mechanics of modifying multilateral agreements can be 
daunting.  For example, customary international law identifies an amendment to a 
multilateral treaty as a new agreement, requiring a state’s affirmative consent to be 
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bound.
4
  While this rule assures that states have not taken on legal obligations 
involuntarily, it can quite evidently fragment the treaty regime by establishing classes of 
parties with differing obligations. 
 
MARPOL addresses this problem in part by establishing limited non-consensus 
procedures.  The agreement sets out simplified mechanisms for adopting or amending 
technical annexes that require approval by only a qualified majority – two-thirds of the 
parties comprising not less than 50% gross tonnage of the world merchant fleet.  After a 
specified "opt-out" period, those actions then become binding on all states that have not 
objected to them.  This procedure allows a subset of states to adopt a policy without 
triggering blocking behavior by those that are not in agreement.  In principle, the 
consequences of publicly rejecting an international standard -- the "mobilization of 
shame" -- tends to discourage states from rejecting new standards.  Although most 
international regimes, including those addressing environment, operate by consensus, 
majority voting may be especially desirable for highly scientific and technical matters.  
Indeed, the example of MARPOL suggests that decisions taken pursuant to an established 
treaty regime administered in the structured setting of an international organization are an 
area where non-consensus decision-making may be particularly palatable to states.
5
 
  
 3.2. World Bank and Regional Development Banks 
 
The World Bank and the regional development banks for Latin America, Asia, 
Africa, and the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are excellent examples of the 
pervasive need for environmental governance structures across functional divides.  The 
multilateral development banks have encountered environmental issues first and foremost 
as impediments to carrying out their institutional mandates – lending money for 
development-related activities.  Unlike the multilateral agreements discussed above that 
are designed to confront environmental problems, environmental concerns in this context 
present themselves as something of an unwelcome burden, or at a minimum a competing 
policy concern. 
 
This setting has nonetheless been an occasion for addressing issues of 
environmental quality through the establishment of rules and good practice standards.  
For example, the World Bank has adopted requirements in such areas as environmental 
assessment, forest policy, and human-rights-related policies such as forced resettlement.  
The structural difference from the multilateral agreements discussed above is that these 
standards are adopted by the international institution and addressed to its own practices; 
by contrast, the typical multilateral environmental regime establishes requirements for 
states parties, and an international organization is more frequently an institutional setting 
for facilitating the regime’s goals.  Although not addressed directly to states, standards 
established by MDBs to apply to their own practices may nonetheless influence 
                                                 
4
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 39 & 40, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). 
 
5
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Environmental Law, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 769-802 (1994). 
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expectations in other settings, such as multilateral environmental agreements, by 
establishing benchmarks of good practice in such areas as pest management. 
 
 The vigor of requirements adopted by the MDBs has been enhanced by the 
creation of an Inspection Panel at the World Bank and analogous mechanisms at the 
regional banks.  Pursuant to resolutions of its Board of Executive Directors, private 
parties in borrowing countries that have been or may be adversely affected by the World 
Bank’s operations – presumably the intended beneficiaries of those operations -- can 
petition this institutional mechanism to investigate and report on the situation by 
reference to the Bank’s own standards.  This major development was the first instance in 
which any multilateral institution has submitted the adequacy of its internal operations to 
external review. Perhaps even more importantly in the long term, the Inspection Panel 
became an entry point through which non-state actors such as citizens' organizations 
could enforce public rights in the international legal system, which does not even 
acknowledge their existence. 
 
 3.3. World Trade Organization 
 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO), like the development banks, is an 
organization in which environmental concerns appear in an unusual structural setting.  
GATT/WTO rules establish tests designed to prevent the abuse of national regulatory 
powers as protectionist trade barriers, as distinguished from legitimate measures for 
protecting public health and the environment.  The WTO dispute settlement process 
provides a forum in which those rules can be applied, lifting trade disputes above the 
national and parochial level and into a rule-of-law setting in which states are obliged to 
defend their actions by reference to principled argument.  Accordingly, in the trade 
regime environmental and public health appear as potential non-tariff barriers to trade, 
and the remedial public policy rationale behind them is in effect a defense by a 
respondent state to a trade-based attack.  Trade rules are designed to define the outer 
limits of an acceptable exercise of a state’s regulatory authority or police jurisdiction, and 
do not mandate its application; rather, they proscribe the exercise of a state’s authority in 
this area in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules.  
 
In practice, these considerations arise in two conceptually distinct but related 
structural contexts.  The first are the basic nondiscrimination requirements originating 
from the GATT as adopted in 1947.  In this setting, measures that are otherwise 
discriminatory may be justified by environmental and public health concerns provided 
certain tests are met.  The second is a suite of Uruguay Round agreements adopted in 
1994 designed to discipline non-discriminatory measures, most notably the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which governs 
certain public health and environmental measures such as food safety regulations by 
reference to scientific tests.  The application of these screens in disputes concerning 
imports of shrimp harvested ways that harm endangered sea turtles, a prohibition on 
hormones in beef, and importation of genetically modified foods and crops have as a 
practical matter required the WTO as an institution – and particularly its Appellate Body 
as the final word in the dispute settlement process – to face daunting fundamental 
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questions about the procedure for adopting, and the content of, environmental and public 
health regulations.  Consequently, WTO dispute settlement jurisprudence, accreting over 
time, has somewhat ironically become a principal source of both international and 
domestic good practice standards and principled approaches to environmental and public 
health regulation on questions such as the appropriate treatment of policy-relevant 
science which may be uncertain or contested. 
 
4. NON-UN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
International institution outside the UN system have also addressed the 
environment, frequently in a manner that reflects the characteristics of the grouping of 
states members of the organization.  Even here, as with UN-related bodies, neat 
distinctions are often elusive.   
 
 4.1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
 
Historically the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has been one of the principal intergovernmental organizations active in the 
environmental area, chiefly through its ministerial-level Environmental Policy 
Committee, which was established in 1970. The OECD, created by multilateral treaty 
in   1960, consists of thirty member states, most of which have industrialized market-
oriented economies. The Secretariat of the Organization, whose primary mandate is to 
promote economic growth and trade, is located in Paris. The OECD serves as an arena for 
multilateral discussion of informational or analytical studies, the negotiation of 
recommendations that contain nonbinding undertakings for those OECD members that 
agree to them, and the adoption of decisions that are binding on member states that accept 
them. 
 
Among other subject matter areas, the OECD has provided a forum for the 
adoption of numerous recommendations on transboundary pollution, environmental 
impact assessment, the polluter-pays principle, and integrated pollution prevention and 
control.  Although perhaps less numerous than nonbinding recommendations in the 
environmental area, binding decisions have been adopted on such matters as exports of 
hazardous wastes. Coordinating national policies and reconciling rational regulatory 
approaches for toxic substances have been particularly active areas, primarily through the 
Chemicals Group.  Addressed directly to private entities and adopted in the form of a 
recommendation, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises contains a chapter 
addressing environment. 
 
The choice of forum for, and form of, multilateral cooperation for undertaking 
environmental initiatives such as exchanging toxicity testing data is revealing. First, these 
efforts have taken place within the 30-member OECD, an international organization that 
is not part of the UN system, which is generally perceived as representing the interests of 
wealthier countries. Although developing countries may be invited to participate in 
OECD work, as in the case of certain of the OECD’s efforts on mutual acceptance of data 
and rules for international investment, there is at least the perception of the strategic 
- 9 - 
value of harmonization among a small, like-minded group with similar interests before 
issues move to universal forum such as the United Nations. 
 
4.2.  Arctic Council 
 
Unique among international institutions addressed in this chapter, and in 
contradistinction to the legally binding regime for the South polar region, the Arctic 
Council is not established by a binding, constitutive, multilateral agreement.  Rather, 
from a legal point of view it is an informal association of Arctic rim states -- Canada, 
Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the United States – whose constituent instrument is the 1996 non-binding 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, adopted in Ottawa.  Its routine 
output is therefore primarily informal and non-binding. although it has also served as a 
forum for negotiating binding agreements such as the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.  The full Council meets 
twice yearly, with interim activities on an ongoing basis, and the position of Chair rotates 
biannually among the Council states.  In 2011 a secretariat was established, located in 
Tromsø, Norway.   
 
Easily accommodated within this flexible structure, the Arctic Council includes 
established participation by six identified non-state bodies as permanent participants 
representing indigenous peoples of the area.  Other states and international organizations, 
such as China, Germany, and UNEP, have the status of permanent observers.  Among its 
efforts, the Council has taken up regional global concerns with an impact on the Arctic 
environment and economy such as loss of sea ice, accelerated Arctic warming due to 
climate change, permafrost melt, thawing of the tundra, mercury and other persistent 
pollutants in the food chain, and ocean acidification, fisheries management, biodiversity 
preservation, and public health.   
    
5. COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS OF EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The demand for responses to environmental and public health problems 
transcends the functional division of expertise characteristic of much international 
governance and many international organizations.  Although many efforts have taken 
place within existing institutions, there have also been particular fields in which 
cooperation among international organizations becomes desirable or essential.  Not 
surprisingly, hybrid undertakings based on cooperation between international institutions, 
generally in response to identifiable needs, have also characterized international 
environmental governance.  The examples identified in this section are representative, 
and do not purport to exhaust the field. 
 
5.1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 
When the issue of climate change began to attract heightened public attention in 
the late 1980s, the international community’s first response was to convene a high-level 
scientific panel, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  The IPCC, 
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which met for the first time in November 1988, was created under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) with a mandate to study the climate change issue primarily from a 
scientific perspective.  Models for assembling advisory groups of prominent scientists 
from multiple countries under international auspices were familiar from previous 
multilateral activity on environmental challenges such as stratospheric ozone depletion, 
but scale and structure of the IPCC were unprecedented. 
 
All members of UNEP and WMO, in effect all UN member states, are eligible to 
participate in the IPCC’s work.  The IPCC’s work product can be understood as a 
massive risk assessment undertaken by an international body of scientists from 
everywhere on the globe to advise the international community as to the nature and extent 
of threats from global climate warming.  Thousands of scientists from all over the world 
participate voluntarily in IPCC activities.  The IPCC’s work, although repeatedly 
challenged, has withstood outside scientific scrutiny, for example by the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences in 2001 after the United States had indicated its intention not to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  The IPPC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. 
 
  2.4.2.  Global Environment Facility 
 
 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in 1991 as a $1 billion 
pilot program in the World Bank to provide funding for environmentally beneficial 
activities.  Together with the World Bank, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the 
UN Development Program (UNDP) were the initial partners in implementing GEF 
projects.  Restructured after the 1992 Earth Summit, the GEF is now an independent, 
free-standing institution administering three trust funds.  The GEF Assembly is the 
plenary body in which representatives of all member countries participate, meeting every 
three to four years, most recently in 2010. 
 
The GEF Council, consisting of 32 members distributed evenly among 
developing countries on the one hand and developed countries and economies in 
transition on the other, serves as the executive body, meeting semiannually.  The 
Secretariat is housed in Washington, and the World Bank serves as Trustee of the GEF 
Trust Fund and provides administrative services.  The GEF provides funding in a number 
of identified areas, such as preservation of biological diversity, and serves as the financial 
mechanism for a number of major environmental multilateral conventions, including the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  The governance structure of 
the GEF appears to have struck something of a balance in responding to concerns from 
developing countries about the delivery of funds through donor-dominated institutions, 
such as the World Bank.   
 
 
6. FREE-STANDING MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 
 
 Although there are prior examples, since the late 1970s or early 1980s there has 
been a consistent, identifiable innovation in environmental governance in the form of 
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free-standing multilateral environmental regimes not formally tied to an international 
organization or institution.  While international organizations are still important as a 
setting for rulemaking – both “hard” or binding requirements or “soft” or non-binding 
good practice standards and recommendations – a model of a free-standing regime 
devoted to a particular problem has emerged.  Many of these agreements are negotiated 
under the auspices of an international institution such as UNEP, and at least as a formal 
matter then sent off to an independent existence on their own.
6
   
 
Significantly, this relatively new institutional phenomenon can be identified by a 
single identifying feature:  the agreements concerned do not create an international 
organization or anything that could be plausibly identified as an international institution 
in the traditional sense.  Rather, there are periodic, typically annual, meetings of the 
parties to take further action as may be called for to assure that the agreement broadly 
understood as an ongoing, organic architecture is responsive to new developments – often 
scientific – or a need to extend its reach.  Typically, these agreements are serviced by 
their own secretariats, which report to the parties to the agreement as a group.  Still, the 
distinctions are far from crisp.  Many of these agreements are still loosely tied to the 
international institution under whose purview they were originally created.  And a 
significant number have ties to other international institutions, most notably the GEF, 
which serves as the funding mechanism for several. 
 
In the typical model, a binding agreement, often identified as a “framework” 
convention, serves as the anchor for the regime.  Although not legally required, the 
expectation has evolved that substantive regulatory requirements will be included in 
ancillary protocols.  The implicit assumption is that the regime is built in a stepwise 
fashion, beginning with the relatively more procedural and structural provisions of the 
framework agreement, to be followed by protocols that contain more substantive 
obligations.  Ordinarily, in the “garden variety” situation, the prototype modern 
framework – sometimes described as an “umbrella” -- convention includes the following 
components: 
 
● Procedural requirements, such as data exchange and reporting, designed in part to 
facilitate a better understanding of the problem, as well as typically to serve as the 
principal vehicle for verifying implementation of the agreement. 
 
● Provision for adoption of ancillary protocols, along with rules for adoption and 
amendment of both the convention itself and any protocols.  Ordinarily the 
convention clarifies the formal legal relationship between the convention and 
ancillary protocols.   
 
● A periodic, typically annual, meeting, frequently identified as a “conference of the 
parties.”  Meetings of parties to any protocols ordinarily take place at the same 
                                                 
6
 See generally Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 A.J.I.L. 
623-659 (2000). 
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time as the conference of the parties to the convention, with non-parties to 
protocols nonetheless present as observers.   
 
● The establishment of subsidiary bodies.  The Framework Convention on Climate 
Change has two institutional entities subordinate to the conference of the parties:  
a Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and a 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). 
 
● Requirements for periodic review of developments in science, policy, and 
procedural issues, typically addressed at the conference of parties Outputs range 
from decisions – generally accepted to be legally non-binding in character – 
amendments, declarations, or a variety of other procedural formats.  Subject 
matter can also vary widely, including the creation of new subsidiary bodies and 
the adoption of procedures on such issues as non-compliance.  
 
● Funding mechanisms, which may be free-standing entities established by and 
reporting to the parties to the convention or protocol in question.  Existing 
institutions, most notably the Global Environment Facility, are generally available 
as a default mechanism. 
 
● Secretariat services, which are sometimes constituted as free-standing entities 
under the agreement in question, or, alternatively, provided by the international 
organization under whose auspices the agreement was negotiated. 
 
● Final clauses containing procedures for amendment of convention and protocols, 
dispute settlement, signature, ratification, accession, and entry into force, as is 
typical for other multilateral conventions. 
 
This model did not emerge overnight, but instead evolved over time.  The ECE’s 
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution was clearly intended to 
serve as a framework for further cooperation, but does not contain a number of the 
features identified above, most notably an authorization for the adoption of subsequent 
protocols and rules for doing so.  Nonetheless, that convention is now the keystone of an 
identifiable regime for addressing transboundary pollution in the ECE region, with eight 
protocols governing air pollutants such as sulfur compounds which are precursors to acid 
rain, nitrogen oxides, and toxic heavy metals. 
 
When states then came together under UNEP auspices to reduce threats to the 
stratospheric ozone layer, they made an explicit decision to undertake the now-familiar 
two-component process, including legally distinct instruments in the form of a framework 
multilateral convention and substantive ancillary protocols. Negotiations on a protocol to 
control chloroflurocarbons, the principal chemicals causing loss of stratospheric ozone, 
proceeded simultaneously with deliberations on the convention until early 1985.  
Moreover, for a considerable portion of the negotiations when the two instruments 
proceeded in tandem, a number of countries including the U.S. called for a mandatory 
CFC protocol to which all parties to the convention would have to adhere.  When 
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negotiations on the CFC protocol broke down, the Vienna Convention on the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer alone was adopted.  Renegotiation of the protocol after a scheduled 
one-year "cooling off" period coincided with a dramatic upsurge in public concern about 
the Antarctic ozone hole, which broke the deadlock and facilitated adoption of the 
Montreal Protocol in September 1987.   
 
The convention-plus-protocols architecture is not in any sense mandated by 
international law, but has nonetheless become ossified as received wisdom about 
environmental governance.  Moreover, as demonstrated by the ozone precedent, there is 
no requirement, legal or otherwise, that conclusion of the convention must precede the 
negotiation and adoption of any substantive protocols.  This expectation nonetheless 
congealed quickly, as demonstrated by subsequent negotiations on the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, in which the debate over whether to include substantive 
emission reduction requirements in the convention became quite acrimonious.
7
 
 
This model can accommodate many innovative governance approaches.  
Protocols range across diverse subject matter and permit considerable flexibility in 
subsequent implementation.  For instance, the first protocol to the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, governs trade in genetically 
modified food and crops – not necessarily the most pressing issue threatening 
biodiversity that could be imagined.  Recently, protocols on liability have been adopted 
under a number of the major multilateral agreements.
8
 In an innovation that is even closer 
to majority voting than MARPOL, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer rejects the customary rule of consensus by explicitly stating that a two-
thirds majority may adopt "adjustments" to the agreement's reduction schedule, which 
then are binding on  all parties to the original instrument without the need for subsequent 
assent.  
 
One of the principal vehicles for extending and modifying these free-standing 
treaty regimes is a decision of the parties to the agreement acting as a group, ordinarily at 
one of their periodic meetings.  This tool is not without legal and policy ambiguity, and 
the extent to which actions can be taken by non-binding decisions as opposed to legally 
binding measures such as amendments to a protocol or the parent convention may be 
unclear, a situation which may in turn have domestic legal consequences. For example, 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants contains a controversial 
                                                 
7
 For a negotiating history of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, see Daniel Bodansky, 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:  A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 451 
(1993). 
 
8
 See. e.g., Günther Doeker & Thomas Gehring, Liability for Environmental Damage, in The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements:  Survey of Existing Legal Instruments 392-435 
(1992); Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in International 
Environmental Law, 55 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 837-904 (2008); Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Reponsibility and 
Liability for Environmental Damage Under International Law: Issues and Trends, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. 
Rev. 279-308 (1998). 
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provision that allows extension of the agreement, which essentially bans substances 
covered by it, to new chemicals by decision rather than a full-blown amendment.
9
 
 
 In addition to the Vienna Convention/Montreal Protocol regime for stratospheric 
ozone and the Framework Convention on Climate Change/Kyoto Protocol superstructure 
addressing global warming, the framework convention-plus-protocols model has been 
adopted in many global agreements, by and large negotiated under UNEP auspices, 
including: 
 
● Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes; 
 
● Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants; 
 
● Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent for Chemicals in International 
Trade; 
 
● UN Convention on Biodiversity;  
 
● UN Convention on Desertification; and 
 
● Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. 
 
Regional agreements, most notably in the ECE, also employ this model.  In addition 
to LRTAP, a good example is the Århus Convention on Public Participation and Access 
to Information, to which a Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers has been 
adopted.  Other treaty regimes addressing environmental issues in whole or part that can 
be characterized as less than universally inclusive include the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, to 
which is appended a 1992 Environmental Protocol, and the 1946 International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.   
 
 Although the model of an organic treaty establishing a comprehensive, self-
contained regime is formally distinct from an international organization, in practice the 
distinction is frequently not so clear.  For example, a number of agreements, most notably 
the ECE regional conventions, rely on secretariats of existing organizations to supply 
those services.  Even those that have technically free-standing secretariats often retain 
ties to the international institution under which they were negotiated.  These regimes, 
moreover, are frequently treated as a practical matter as if they had legal personality.  For 
example, the conventions for which the GEF serves as the funding mechanism provide 
advice to that institution, more or less as if the conventions themselves were formally 
constituted as independent entities under international law.  While the environmental-
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Pep Fuller & Thomas W. McGarrity, Beyond the Dirty Dozen: The Bush Administration's 
Cautious Approach to Listing New Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Future of the Stockholm 
Convention, 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1-34 (2003).  See also Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (domestic applicability of 
decisions adopted pursuant to Montreal Protocol). 
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treaty-as-governance-structure is formally an alternative approach to rulemaking in 
formally constituted international organization, the distinction is blurry and perhaps 
ultimately without much practical significance.   
 
7. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
 Bilateral and regional agreements also present their own embellishments to the 
structural treatment of environment as an international governance matter.  While there 
are thousands of bilateral and regional agreements that address environment outside the 
UN system, the examples in this section have unusual or unique attributes that further 
highlight the range and diversity of the challenges presented by international 
environmental law, policy, and governance. 
 
  7.1. Bilateral Investment Treaties and NAFTA Chapter 11 
 
 Beginning in the 1970s, first European countries and then the United States began 
to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that were intended to resolve both the 
substantive and procedural weaknesses in the customary law governing foreign 
investment by (1) establishing clearer, treaty-based tests for actionable measures taken 
against foreign investors; and (2) creating dispute settlement mechanisms that could be 
initiated by private party investors directly against the host state, eliminating the 
involvement of the government of the home state.  Although some BITs anticipated 
dispute settlement by free-standing arbitral tribunals such as those governed by 
UNCITRAL rules, many referred investor-state disputes to the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  The trilateral North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the first free trade agreement to incorporate rules on 
investment, modeled on those in BITs, in its chapter 11. 
 
Although the expectation was that chapter 11 would apply primarily to Mexico, 
the first dispute investment dispute was initiated by a U.S. investor again Canada over its 
effective prohibition of a fuel additive.
10
  Canada settled and removed the measure, 
triggering a flood of similar challenges to environmental measures as violations of 
NAFTA’s investment rules.  A number of these were addressed through ICSID, where a 
number of procedural limitations became apparent:  (1) the absence of a mechanism for 
assuring continuity in jurisprudence, as the there is no rule of binding precedent (stare 
decisis) and awards of arbitral tribunals as a matter of principle have no precedential 
force; (2) the absence of measures for public participation either in the form of written 
submissions or access to oral hearings; and (3) the absence of an appellate mechanism to 
correct errors and resolve disputed questions of law.  As a result of concerns over the 
potential for attacks on environmental measures as inconsistent with investment rules, 
newly-negotiated BITS increasingly include specific protections for environmental 
                                                 
10
 See Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel Additives 
Controversy, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 55-96 (1999); Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of its Kind 
and a Harbinger of Things to Come, 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 187-202 (2000). 
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measures, and the U.S. model BIT
11
 now includes an entire article that at least partially 
clarifies this issue. 
 
  7.2. North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
 
In response to highly public and vociferous concerns over the environmental 
effects of the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), then-President 
Clinton, declining to renegotiate the text of NAFTA proper, advocated the adoption of 
new “side agreements” on environment and labor. The resulting North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) established a trilateral Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) headed by a council consisting of the environment 
ministers of the three NAFTA states.  The CEC is serviced by a professional secretariat in 
Montreal and advised by a committee of Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. nationals 
appointed in their personal capacities.  
 
According to policymakers, the principal environmental concern was not a 
divergence in national standards among the three NAFTA countries, but, rather, the need 
to provide effective enforcement mechanisms for fully implementing existing national 
laws. The NAAEC consequently assigned the CEC Secretariat the responsibility to 
receive and process citizen submissions alleging that one of the NAFTA parties has failed 
effectively to enforce its domestic law, as specified in Articles 14 and 15 of the 
agreement. The CEC citizen submission process, a major innovation in public 
international law in providing a complaint mechanism that can be initiated by private 
parties, begins when a nongovernmental organization or individual lodges a submission 
with the CEC Secretariat alleging that one of the three NAFTA governments “is failing to 
effectively enforce its environmental law.” 
 
The Secretariat first conducts an initial consideration of the admissibility of the 
submission, determines whether the submission warrants developing a factual record, and 
transmits its recommendation to the CEC Council. The Council, by two-thirds vote, then 
instructs the Secretariat whether to prepare a factual record. After the Secretariat prepares 
a factual record the Council, by two-thirds vote, decides whether to make the factual 
record public.  As of this writing, there have been more than 80 citizen submissions 
resulting in 17 factual records, of which only one was prepared in response to a 
submission concerning the United States.
12
  The citizen submission process has been 
replicated with some modifications in other regional and bilateral trade agreements to 
which the U.S. is a party, most notably the Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). 
 
                                                 
11
 http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
 
12
   For a summary of citizen submissions on enforcement matters to date and a link to the docket in 
each, see http://cectracker.nma.ca.  The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-
Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, is an example of a treaty creating a bilateral international organization that has 
had great influence on environmental issues, the International Joint Commission. 
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8. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL AND 
REGULATORY TOOLBOX 
 
 As demonstrated by this examination, the number and variety of international 
institutional settings available to address substantive environmental goals is enormous.  
Similarly, in response to the challenges posed by the need for effective environmental 
governance, the range of available legal and policy instruments is similarly diverse.  
These two attributes – institutional setting and regulatory design – are in fact deeply 
intertwined.
13
  Based on the previous analysis, one can identify any number of precedents 
in the form of both institutional and policy options available in response to environmental 
challenges:   
 
● Multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements establishing binding obligations 
for states; 
 
● Adoption of protocols by free-stranding regimes establishing binding obligations 
for states (e.g., 8 protocols adopted under LRTAP); 
 
● Binding actions taken by existing organizations establishing normative standards 
for states (e.g. OECD decisions); 
 
● Non-binding actions taken by institutions not constituted by multilateral 
agreement (e.g., Arctic Council); 
 
● Non-binding actions taken by existing organizations establishing good-practice 
standards for states or intended to harmonize state practice (e.g., OECD 
recommendations); 
 
● Decisions taken pursuant to the authority of framework conventions by free-
standing regimes (e.g., COP decisions, typically non-binding); 
 
● Decisions taken pursuant to the authority of protocols adopted under authority of 
free-standing regimes (e.g., MOP decisions, typically non-binding, addressed only 
to parties to protocol); 
 
● Non-consensus decision-making procedures (e.g., MARPOL 73/78, Montreal 
Protocol);  
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal The Rational Design of 
International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761-799  (2001).  With respect to effectiveness, see Engaging 
Countries:  Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Edith Brown Weiss & 
Harold K. Jacobson eds. 1998); The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments:  Theory and Practice (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff 1998);  
Making Law Work:  Environmental Compliance and Sustainable Development (Durwood Zaelke, Donald 
Kaniaru & Eva Kružíková eds. (2005) (2 volumes). 
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● Non-binding actions taken by existing organizations establishing good-practice 
standards for non-state actors (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises); 
 
● Non-binding standards intended to serve as models for binding substantive 
agreements (e.g., UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact 
Assessment/ECE Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment); 
 
● Good practice standards transformed into binding obligations in particular 
contexts (e.g., World Bank Operational Standards incorporated into binding loan 
agreements); 
 
● Binding obligations applied in state-to-state dispute resolution (e.g., WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings); and 
 
● Binding obligations applied in bilateral investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms (e.g., NAFTA chapter 11, BITs); 
 
● Institutional requirements applied at civil society initiative to international 
organizations (e.g., World Bank, regional development bank Inspection Panel 
mechanisms); and 
 
● International obligations applied at civil society initiative to states in adjudicatory 
mode (e.g., NACWEC citizen complaint mechanism). 
 
These factors operate along a number of axes in multiple dimensions 
simultaneously.  One attribute is institutional structure, which can range from among the 
most formally constituted international organizations to free-standing multilateral 
environmental agreements to an informal assemblage of states like the Arctic Council.  A 
setting that lacks any capacity to adopt binding measures would seem at first blush to be 
poorly positioned to effect positive environmental change.  But it may be that the 
situation is not yet ripe for legally binding commitments, and trying to force them 
prematurely could be counterproductive.  If legal commitment is necessary, there is 
always the possibility of adopting a free-standing treaty, even under the auspices of the 
most loosely structured institutional arrangement. 
 
While it would be tempting to make distinctions between actions taken in the 
context of formally-structured international organizations and free-standing treaty 
regimes, it is not clear that there is much of a distinction in outcomes.  Instead, actual 
practice appears to range along a continuum.  Choices such as the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe as a vehicle for negotiating regional air pollution agreements 
appear to be a product of time and place, with the availability of an existing international 
organization as a forum in that particular setting enhancing the likelihood of a successful 
outcome by comparison with the possibility of starting from scratch. 
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A second feature of institutional setting concerns the breadth of subject matter 
coverage, as contrasted with functional compartmentalization.  International 
environmental governance has frequently been criticized for its fragmented character, and 
invites the inference of a lack of multilateral coherence.  Even the secretariats of 
multilateral environmental agreements are flung literally over the globe, at least 
potentially exacerbating the situation.  As a consequence, several influential actors have 
made serious proposals advocating the creation of a new international organization 
characterized by broader subject matter coverage and greater effectiveness, such as the 
creation of an executive body with enhanced powers.
14
  
 
Third, decision-making procedures, whether based on consensus or rules that 
allow actions to be taken in situations in which some states may not be entirely in 
agreement, can affect the efficacy of a regime.  While non-consensus rules might seem to 
overcome the possibility of least-common-denominator results, it is not necessarily 
productive to bind states without their consent.  Significantly, although states in the 
Montreal Protocol regime have the option to adopt binding revisions through procedures 
that approach majority voting, that power has been sparingly used.  Because of the strong 
political will behind the instrument, the decision to add new substances to the regime 
through a formal, consensus amendment process may very well have contributed to the 
efficacy of what is generally regarded as the most successful of all international 
environmental regimes. 
 
And, of course, the question of choice of instrument, whether binding or non-
binding, is a crucial one.  But there again, one must be cautious in reflexively assuming 
that legally binding rules are innately superior.  In contrast to a “hard” international 
agreement, a non-binding “soft” instrument may allow states to gain experience with 
more ambitious, aspirational goals in a milieu that is perceived as less risky. By contrast, 
under such circumstances states might commit to binding or “hard” treaty obligations 
only of a modest character, if at all. Alternatively, non-binding instruments may also be 
appropriate for circumstances in which consensus is elusive or illusory, while nonetheless 
supporting more aggressive policy action by those states that are prepared to do so. Non-
binding instruments may be attractive alternatives to a downward spiral toward a least 
common denominator, a result characteristic of many multilateral efforts.
15
 
                                                 
14
.  E.g., Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 323-362 
(2002); Daniel C. Esty & Maria Ivanova,  Making International Environmental Efforts Work: The Case for 
a Global Environmental Organization (Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy Working Working 
Paper 2/1, May 2001) http://www.yale.edu/gegdialogue; Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf & Markus Knigge, A 
United Nations Environment Organization, in  Global Environmental Governance – Perspectives on the 
Current Debate 124-141 (Lydia Swart & Estelle Perry eds. 2007) (describing EU initiative in UN to 
“upgrade” UNEP); C. Ford Runge, et al. Freer Trade, Protected Environment:  Balancing Trade 
Liberalization and Environmental Interests (1994). 
 
15
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Brown Weiss ed. 1997).   
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
 The wide variety and great flexibility of both institutional structures and 
substantive regulatory tools available to international policy makers in the field of the 
environment is perhaps unique in the field of international organizations.  In principle, 
this attribute should enable a reasonably precise fit between substantive environmental 
challenges on the one hand and international governance responses on the other.  It would 
be intellectually appealing to assume that form can be neatly matched to function, but it is 
difficult to say that that is the case in actual practice.  Rather, many choices in the field 
appear to be fortuitous, based on criteria unique to the situation presented.  And it is not 
at all clear that that is an undesirable situation, given the number and magnitude of the 
challenges to be surmounted in the ongoing search for effective international 
environmental governance. 
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